A supressão da defesa preliminar nas ações de improbidade administrativa com a entrada em vigor da Lei 14.230/2021: uma análise acerca da (in)compatibilidade com o princípio do contraditório e ampla defesa sob a ótica das prerrogativas dos agentes públicos

Abstract

The present work is intended to analyze the change made by Law 14.230/2021 in the preliminary phase of the administrative improbity action (AIA), specifically with regard to the suppression of prior defense and the right of the accused to the adversary and full defense. The old wording of Law 8.429/1992 (Administrative Improbity Law) established that, once the initial petition is presented by the accuser in court containing the description of the facts and the alleged act of administrative improbity practiced, the magistrate should provide the accused public agent with a modality of preliminary defense, prior to the admissibility judgment of the action, since the initiation of a reckless action of this nature can cause several damages to the accused. However, with the entry into force of Law 14.230/2021, the preliminary defense was removed from the EIA rite and several debates were generated about this suppression with regard to the right of defense of the accused. In this sense, the objective of this work is to evaluate whether the extinction of the prior defense in the embryonic phase of the administrative improbity action is compatible or not with the principles of the contradictory and the ample defense