A utilização dos critérios definidos pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal para a aplicação do princípio da insignificância e a discricionariedade do julgador

Abstract

The present work aims to present the way of applying the principle of insignificance in Criminal Law, questioning whether such an institute seeks, in fact, to intervene minimally in the resolution of social conflicts or is it an instrument that gives rise to the phenomenon of penal selectivity. For this, an approach is made from the basis of this principle, given by Roxin, to its current applicability. Thus, enabling the conceptualization of the principle of insignificance, which has as objective to make the criminal conduct materially atypical. The work was based on seek doctrinal foundation from the most diverse authors, as well as existing jurisprudence on the subject, including the Superior Courts, which although they have a pacified understanding, at times they fail to exalt the character subsidiary of Criminal Law, leaving aside the minimum intervention and entering the field of penal selectivity, due to the high degree of discretion that criteria for applying the principle of insignificance allow applicators of the Right